The former of these is unity expressed in useless fashion as a maxim， the distinction of the undistinguishable， A=A； it is the definition of thinking， but not a maxim which could contain a truth as content， or it does not express the Notion of distinction as such. The other important principle was， on the other hand： What is not distinguished in thought is not distinguished (p. 333). “The maxim of the reason is that everything has its reason，”(19) - the particular has the universal as its essential reality. Necessary truth must have its reason in itself in such a manner that it is found by analysis， i.e. through that very maxim of identity. For analysis is the very favourite plan of resolving into ****** ideas and principles： a resolution which annihilates their relation， and which therefore in fact forms a transition into the opposite， though it does not have the consciousness of the same， and on that account also excludes the Notion； for every opposite it lays hold of only in its identity.
Sufficient reason seems to be a pleonasm； but Leibnitz understood by this aims， final causes (caus？ finales)， the difference between which and the causal nexus or the efficient cause he here brings under discussion.(20)c. The universal itself， absolute essence， which with Leibnitz is something quite different from the monads， separates itself also into two sides， namely universal Being and Being as the unity of opposites.
That universal is God， as the cause of the world， to the consciousness of whom the above principle of sufficient reason certainly forms the transition. The existence of God is only an inference from eternal truths； for these must as the laws of nature have a universal sufficient reason which determines itself as none other than God. Eternal truth is therefore the consciousness of the universal and absolute in and for itself； and this universal and absolute is God， who， as one with Himself， the monad of monads， is the absolute Monad. Here we again have the wearisome proof of His existence： He is the fountain of eternal truths and Notions， and without Him no potentiality would have actuality； He has the prerogative of existing immediately in His potentiality.(21) God is here also the unity of potentiality and actuality， but in an uncomprehending manner； what is necessary， but not comprehended， is transferred to Him. Thus God is at first comprehended chiefly as universal， but already in the aspect of the relation of opposites.
As regards this second aspect， the absolute relation of opposites， it occurs in the first place in the form of absolute opposites of thought， the good and the evil. “God is the Author of the world，”
says Leibnitz； that refers directly to evil. It is round this relation that philosophy specially revolves， but to the unity of which it did not then attain； the evil in the world was not comprehended， because no advance was made beyond the fixed opposition. The result of Leibnitz's Théodicée is an optimism supported on the lame and wearisome thought that God， since a world had to be brought into existence， chose out of infinitely many possible worlds the best possible - the most perfect， so far as it could be perfect， considering the finite element which it was to contain.(22)This may very well be said in a general way， but this perfection is no determined thought， but a loose popular expression， a sort of babble respecting an imaginary or fanciful potentiality； Voltaire made merry over it. Nor is the nature of the finite therein defined. Because the world， it is said， has to be the epitome of finite Beings， evil could not be separated from it， since evil is negation， finitude.(23) Reality and negation remain standing in opposition to one another exactly in the same way as before. That is the principal conception in the Théodicée. But something very like this can be said in every day life. If I have some goods brought to me in the market at some town， and say that they are certainly not perfect， but the best that are to be got， this is quite a good reason why Ishould content myself with them. But comprehension is a very different thing from this. Leibnitz says nothing further than that the world is good， but there is also evil in it； the matter remains just the same as it was before. “Because it had to be finite” is then a mere arbitrary choice on the part of God. The next question would be： Why and how is there finitude in the Absolute and His decrees？ And only then should there be deduced from the determination of finitude the evil which no doubt exists therein.
