attend to these principles of common sense; and this would make his appeal to be, like that of Kant and Hamilton, to stern necessity.It is worthy of being stated that, in his manuscript papers, an answer is attempted to some of these questions, and this of a more satisfactory kind than any thing I have noticed in his published writings." As soon as this truth is understood, that two and two make four, I immediately assent to it; because God has given me the faculty of immediately discerning its truth, and if Ihad not this faculty, I would not perceive its truth.The truth {224} itself, therefore, does not depend on my constitution; for it was a truth before my existence, and will be a truth, although I were annihilated: but my perception evidently depends on my constitution, and particularly upon my having, as a part of my constitution, that faculty, whether you call it reason or common sense, by which I perceive or discern this truth." "The truth of this proposition, that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends on the constitution of a lion, and upon nothing else." In like manner as to right and wrong "although the rectitude or depravity has a real existence in this case, yet it cannot be discerned by a spectator who has not the faculty of discerning objects of this kind." "Evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief; and he who desires reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means." Any one who would join into a consistent whole the various characteristics referred to in this paper, and give each its exact place, will advance a step beyond Reid, and, I may add, beyond Hamilton.The question occurs, Why has he not' placed these statements in his published works? Was it because he was not prepared to reduce them to a rigid consistency, and was averse to utter anything which he could not stand by in every respect?
It is also worthy of being noticed that, in one of the manuscripts, he shows that he had a glimpse of the distinction between what Kant calls analytic and synthetic judgments.The question is put, "Is there not a difference between the evidence of some first principles and others?"and he answers, "There are various differences.This seems to be one, that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evidently contained in the subject, as in this, two and three are equal to five, a man has flesh and blood; for, in these and the like self-evident principles, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it.
There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject, as when we affirm that a thing which begins to exist must have a cause." This last is an example of what Kant calls synthetic judgments a priori.Reid, however, has not laid hold of the distinction so firmly as Kant, nor did he see its importance, and elaborate it so fully as the great German metaphysician.It is interesting to notice these correspondences between the Scottish and German opponents of Hume.{225}
I do not mean to dwell on the remaining portion of the essays, which contain many sound remarks, but little that is fresh and novel.
<Reasoning>.This essay has nothing worthy of comment, except a vigorous attempt to show, as against Locke, that morality is not capable of demonstration.
<Taste>.He argues that "it implies an original faculty, and that it is in the moral and intellectual perfections of mind, and in its active powers, that beauty originally dwells." In a letter to Rev.Archibald Alison, he claims: " I am proud to think that I first, in clear and explicit terms, and in the cool blood of a philosopher, maintained that all the beauty and sublimity of objects of sense is derived from the expression they exhibit of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty." (p.89.)Possibly this may be a pretty close approximation to the truth.It seems to me to be a more just and enlightened view than that presented by Alison, and those Scotch metaphysicians who refer beauty to the association of ideas capable of raising feeling.
