LET us now discuss sophistic refutations，i.e.what appear to berefutations but are really fallacies instead.We will begin in thenatural order with the first.
That some reasonings are genuine，while others seem to be so but arenot，is evident.This happens with arguments，as also elsewhere,through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham.Forphysically some people are in a vigorous condition，while other smerely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as thetribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty，while others seem to be so，bydint of embellishing themselves.So it is，too，with inanimate things;for of these，too，some are really silver and others gold，whileothers are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e.g.thingsmade of litharge and tin seem to be of silver，while those made ofyellow metal look golden.In the same way both reasoning andrefutation are sometimes genuine，sometimes not，though inexperiencemay make them appear so：for inexperienced people obtain only，as itwere，a distant view of these things.For reasoning rests on certainstatements such that they involve necessarily the assertion ofsomething other than what has been stated，through what has beenstated：refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of thegiven conclusion.Now some of them do not really achieve this,though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these themost prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon namesonly.It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual thingsdiscussed：we use their names as symbols instead of them; andtherefore we suppose that what follows in the names，follows in thethings as well，just as people who calculate suppose in regard totheir counters.But the two cases (names and things) are not alike.
For names are finite and so is the sum—total of formulae，while thingsare infinite in number.Inevitably，then，the same formulae，and asingle name，have a number of meanings.Accordingly just as，incounting，those who are not clever in manipulating their countersare taken in by the experts，in the same way in arguments too thosewho are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason bothin their own discussions and when they listen to others.For thisreason，then，and for others to be mentioned later，there existsboth reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real.Now forsome people it is better worth while to seem to be wise，than to bewise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is thesemblance of wisdom without the reality，and the sophist is one whomakes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them，then，it isclearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise manrather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so.To reduce it toa single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows athing，himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows andto be able to show up the man who makes them; and of theseaccomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer,and the other upon the securing of one.Those，then，who would besophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid：for itis worth their while：for a faculty of this kind will make a manseem to be wise，and this is the purpose they happen to have in view.
Clearly，then，there exists a class of arguments of this kind，andit is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists.
Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophisticalarguments，and how many in number are the elements of which thisfaculty is composed，and how many branches there happen to be ofthis inquiry，and the other factors that contribute to this art.
Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes:
Didactic，Dialectical，Examination—arguments，and Contentiousarguments.Didactic arguments are those that reason from theprinciples appropriate to each subject and not from the opinionsheld by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust):
dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generallyaccepted，to the contradictory of a given thesis:
examination—arguments are those that reason from premisses which areaccepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possessknowledge of the subject is bound to know—in what manner，has beendefined in another treatise：contentious arguments are those thatreason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses thatappear to be generally accepted but are not so.The subject，then,of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics,while that of dialectic arguments and examination—arguments has beendiscussed elsewhere：let us now proceed to speak of the arguments usedin competitions and contests.
First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those whoargue as competitors and rivals to the death.These are five innumber，refutation，fallacy，paradox，solecism，and fifthly toreduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling—i.e.to constrainhim to repeat himself a number of times：or it is to produce theappearance of each of these things without the reality.For theychoose if possible plainly to refute the other party，or as the secondbest to show that he is committing some fallacy，or as a third best tolead him into paradox，or fourthly to reduce him to solecism，i.e.
to make the answerer，in consequence of the argument，to use anungrammatical expression; or，as a last resort，to make him repeathimself.
