Moreover，just as in rhetorical discourses，so also in those aimed at refutation，you should examine the discrepancies of the answerer”s position either with his own statements，or with those of persons whom he admits to say and do aright，moreover with those of people who are generally supposed to bear that kind of character，or who are like them，or with those of the majority or of all men.Also just as answerers，too，often，when they are in process of being confuted，draw a distinction，if their confutation is just about to take place，so questioners also should resort to this from time to time to counter objectors，pointing out，supposing that against one sense of the words the objection holds，but not against the other,that they have taken it in the latter sense，as e.g.Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus.They should also break off their argument and cut down their other lines of attack，while in answering，if a man perceives this being done beforehand，he should put in his objection and have his say first.One should also lead attacks sometimes against positions other than the one stated，on the understood condition that one cannot find lines of attack against the view laid down，as Lycophron did when ordered to deliver a eulogy upon the lyre.To counter those who demand ”Against what are you directing your effort?”，since one is generally thought bound to state the charge made，while，on the other hand，some ways of stating it make the defence too easy，you should state as your aim only the general result that always happens in refutations，namely the contradiction of his thesis —viz.that your effort is to deny what he has affirmed，or to affirm what he denied：don”t say that you are trying to show that the knowledge of contraries is，or is not，the same.One must not ask one”s conclusion in the form of a premiss，while some conclusions should not even be put as questions at all; one should take and use it as granted.
We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions，and the methods of questioning in contentious disputations：next we have to speak of answering，and of how solutions should be made，and of what requires them，and of what use is served by arguments of this kind.
The use of them，then，is，for philosophy，twofold.For in the first place，since for the most part they depend upon the expression，they put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is used，and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur between things and between their names.In the second place they are useful for one”s own personal researches; for the man who is easily committed to a fallacy by some one else，and does not perceive it,is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions.
Thirdly and lastly，they further contribute to one”s reputation,viz.the reputation of being well trained in everything，and not inexperienced in anything：for that a party to arguments should find fault with them，if he cannot definitely point out their weakness,creates a suspicion，making it seem as though it were not the truth of the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper.
Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind，if our previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came，and also our distinctions adequate of the forms of dishonesty in putting questions.But it is not the same thing take an argument in one”s hand and then to see and solve its faults，as it is to be able to meet it quickly while being subjected to questions：for what we know，we often do not know in a different context.Moreover，just as in other things speed is enhanced by training，so it is with arguments too,so that supposing we are unpractised，even though a point be clear to us，we are often too late for the right moment.Sometimes too it happens as with diagrams; for there we can sometimes analyse the figure，but not construct it again：so too in refutations，though we know the thing on which the connexion of the argument depends，we still are at a loss to split the argument apart.
First then，just as we say that we ought sometimes to choose to prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth，so also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general estimation than according to the truth.For it is a general rule in fighting contentious persons，to treat them not as refuting，but as merely appearing to refute：for we say that they don”t really prove their case，so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel the appearance of it.For if refutation be an unambiguous contradiction arrived at from certain views，there could be no need to draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambiguity：they do not effect a proof.The only motive for drawing further distinctions is that the conclusion reached looks like a refutation.What，then，we have to beware of，is not being refuted，but seeming to be，because of course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon ambiguity，and all the other tricks of that kind，conceal even a genuine refutation，and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not.For since one has the right at the end，when the conclusion is drawn，to say that the only denial made of One”s statement is ambiguous，no matter how precisely he may have addressed his argument to the very same point as oneself，it is not clear whether one has been refuted：for it is not clear whether at the moment one is speaking the truth.If，on the other hand，one had drawn a distinction，and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the amphiboly，the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty.
Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers，though less so nowadays than formerly，would have been fulfilled，namely thatthe person questioned should answer either ”Yes” or ”No”：whereas nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put：for certainly,if the questioner distinguishes his meaning adequately，the answerer is bound to reply either ”Yes” or ”No”.
