Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing thathe knows，singly？but not the things that he knows，collectively.”
Also a man treads，perhaps，on any thing he walks through，but noton the time he walks through.Likewise also in the case of the otherexamples.
In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident，one and thesame solution meets all cases.For since it is indeterminate when anattribute should be ascribed to a thing，in cases where it belongsto the accident of the thing，and since in some cases it isgenerally agreed and people admit that it belongs，while in othersthey deny that it need belong，we should therefore，as soon as theconclusion has been drawn，say in answer to them all alike，that thereis no need for such an attribute to belong.One must，however，beprepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant.Allarguments such as the following depend upon Accident.”Do you knowwhat I am going to ask you？you know the man who is approaching”，or”the man in the mask”？”Is the statue your work of art?” or ”Is thedog your father?”Is the product of a small number with a smallnumber a small number?” For it is evident in all these cases thatthere is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing”saccident to be true of the thing as well.For only to things thatare indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed thatall the same attributes belong; whereas in the case of a good thing,to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of aquestion; nor in the case of a man approaching，or wearing a mask,is ”to be approaching” the same thing as ”to be Coriscus”，so thatsuppose I know Coriscus，but do not know the man who is approaching,it still isn”t the case that I both know and do not know the same man;nor，again，if this is mine and is also a work of art，is it thereforemy work of art，but my property or thing or something else.(Thesolution is after the same manner in the other cases as well.)Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original propositionasked：for they say that it is possible to know and not to know thesame thing，only not in the same respect：accordingly，when they don”tknow the man who is coming towards them，but do know Corsicus，theyassert that they do know and don”t know the same object，but not inthe same respect.Yet，as we have already remarked，the correctionof arguments that depend upon the same point ought to be the same,whereas this one will not stand if one adopts the same principle inregard not to knowing something，but to being，or to being is a in acertain state，e.g.suppose that X is father，and is also yours：forif in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not toknow the same thing，yet with that case the solution stated hasnothing to do.Certainly there is nothing to prevent the same argumentfrom having a number of flaws; but it is not the exposition of any andevery fault that constitutes a solution：for it is possible for aman to show that a false conclusion has been proved，but not to showon what it depends，e.g.in the case of Zeno”s argument to provethat motion is impossible.So that even if any one were to try toestablish that this doctrine is an impossible one，he still ismistaken，and even if he proved his case ten thousand times over,still this is no solution of Zeno”s argument：for the solution was allalong an exposition of false reasoning，showing on what its falsitydepends.If then he has not proved his case，or is trying to establisheven a true proposition，or a false one，in a false manner，to pointthis out is a true solution.Possibly，indeed，the presentsuggestion may very well apply in some cases：but in these cases，atany rate，not even this would be generally agreed：for he knows boththat Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure isapproaching.To know and not to know the same thing is generallythought to be possible，when e.g.one knows that X is white，butdoes not realize that he is musical：for in that way he does knowand not know the same thing，though not in the same respect.But as tothe approaching figure and Coriscus he knows both that it isapproaching and that he is Coriscus.
A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that ofthose who solve the proof that every number is a small number：for if,when the conclusion is not proved，they pass this over and say thata conclusion has been proved and is true，on the ground that everynumber is both great and small，they make a mistake.
Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve theaforesaid reasonings，e.g.the proof that ”X is your father”，or”son”，or ”slave”.Yet it is evident that if the appearance a proofdepends upon a plurality of meanings，the term，or the expression inquestion，ought to bear a number of literal senses，whereas no onespeaks of A as being ”B”s child” in the literal sense，if B is thechild”s master，but the combination depends upon Accident.”Is Ayours?”Yes.”And is A a child?”Yes.”Then the child A is yours,”
because he happens to be both yours and a child; but he is not ”yourchild”.
