There is also the proof that ”something "of evils" is good”; forwisdom is a ”knowledge "of evils"”.But the expression that this is”of so and—so” (=”so—and—so”s”) has not a number of meanings：it meansthat it is ”so—and—so”s property”.We may suppose of course，on theother hand，that it has a number of meanings—for we also say thatman is ”of the animals”，though not their property; and also thatany term related to ”evils” in a way expressed by a genitive case ison that account a so—and—so ”of evils”，though it is not one of theevils—but in that case the apparently different meanings seem todepend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely.”Yet itis conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase"Something of evils is good".” Perhaps，but not with regard to thephrase in question.It would occur more nearly，suppose that ”Aservant is good of the wicked”; though perhaps it is not quite foundeven there：for a thing may be ”good” and be ”X”s” without being atthe same time ”X”s good”.Nor is the saying that ”Man is of theanimals” a phrase with a number of meanings：for a phrase does notbecome possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose we expressit elliptically：for we express ”Give me the Iliad” by quoting halfa line of it，e.g.”Give me "Sing，goddess，of the wrath..."”
Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of aparticular thing，or in a particular respect，or place，or manner,or relation，and not valid absolutely，should be solved by consideringthe conclusion in relation to its contradictory，to see if any ofthese things can possibly have happened to it.For it is impossiblefor contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative tobelong to the same thing absolutely; there is，however，nothing toprevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation ormanner，or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particularrespect and the other absolutely.So that if this one belongsabsolutely and that one in a particular respect，there is as yet norefutation.This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion byexamining it in comparison with its contradictory.
All arguments of the following kind have this feature：”Is itpossible for what is—not to be？"No." But，you see，it is something,despite its not being.” Likewise also，Being will not be; for itwill not he some particular form of being.Is it possible for the sameman at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath?”Canthe same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man?”
Or isn”t it the case that being something in particular and Beingare not the same？On the other hand，Not—being，even if it besomething，need not also have absolute ”being” as well.Nor if a mankeeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particularrespect，is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely，but hewho swears that he will break his oath，and then breaks it，keeps thisparticular oath only; he is not a keeper of his oath：nor is thedisobedient man ”obedient”，though he obeys one particular command.
The argument is similar，also，as regards the problem whether the sameman can at the same time say what is both false and true：but itappears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to seein which of the two connexions the word ”absolutely” is to berendered—with ”true” or with ”false”.There is，however，nothing toprevent it from being false absolutely，though true in some particularrespect or relation，i.e.being true in some things，though not ”true”
absolutely.Likewise also in cases of some particular relation andplace and time.For all arguments of the following kind depend uponthis.” Is health，or wealth，a good thing?”Yes.”But to the foolwho does not use it aright it is not a good thing：therefore it isboth good and not good.”Is health，or political power，a goodthing?”Yes."But sometimes it is not particularly good：thereforethe same thing is both good and not good to the same man.” Or ratherthere is nothing to prevent a thing，though good absolutely，being notgood to a particular man，or being good to a particular man，and yetnot good or here.”Is that which the prudent man would not wish，anevil?”Yes.”But to get rid of，he would not wish the good:
therefore the good is an evil.” But that is a mistake; for it is notthe same thing to say ”The good is an evil” and ”to get rid of thegood is an evil”.Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken.
For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing，acquiringthings is also evil：what he wishes，therefore，is not what is evilbut what is good; for to acquire something good is good.Also，diseaseis an evil thing，but not to get rid of disease.”Is the justpreferable to the unjust，and what takes place justly to what takesplace unjustly？”Yes.”But to to be put to death unjustly ispreferable.”Is it just that each should have his own?”Yes.”Butwhatever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his personalopinion，even if it be a false opinion，are valid in law：thereforethe same result is both just and unjust.” Also，should one decide infavour of him who says what is unjust?”The former.”But you see，itis just for the injured party to say fully the things he has suffered;and these are fallacies.For because to suffer a thing unjustly ispreferable，unjust ways are not therefore preferable，though in thisparticular case the unjust may very well be better than the just.
Also，to have one”s own is just，while to have what is another”s isnot just：all the same，the decision in question may very well be ajust decision，whatever it be that the opinion of the man who gave thedecision supports：for because it is just in this particular case orin this particular manner，it is not also just absolutely.Likewisealso，though things are unjust，there is nothing to prevent thespeaking of them being just：for because to speak of things is just,there is no necessity that the things should be just，any more thanbecause to speak of things be of use，the things need be of use.
Likewise also in the case of what is just.So that it is not thecase that because the things spoken of are unjust，the victory goes tohim who speaks unjust things：for he speaks of things that are just tospeak of，though absolutely，i.e.to suffer，they are unjust.
